Publications


October 30, 2008

Looking for profit for 'social enterprise'; an economic analysis

Mid 2007, the government announced the ‘Maatschappelijke Onderneming’ (i.e. ‘social enterprise’) as a draft of a new (additional) legal form for non-profit organisations.

December 17, 2007

Non-profit provision of job training and mediation services; an empirical analysis using contract data of job training service providers

This paper analyses the relative performance and selection behaviour of not-for-profit (NFP) job training service providers, using contract data from the Dutch social benefit administration.

March 7, 2007

Do non-profits make a difference? Evaluating non-profit vis-à-vis for-profit organisations in social services

This CPB Document provides a framework for the evaluation of non-profit organisations. This framework addresses the question under which conditions, and, if so, in what way non-profits should be stimulated.

August 25, 2006

Disability insurance and unemployment insurance as substitute pathways

In this paper, we estimate the degree of substitution between enrolment into Disability Insurance (DI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) in the Netherlands.

August 25, 2006

Hidden unemployment in disability insurance in the Netherlands; an empirical analysis based on employer data

In this paper, we construct and estimate a (semi-) structural model, so as to uncover the fraction of hidden unemployment in the Disability Insurance (DI) enrolment rate.

March 7, 2006

Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study

Using a simple production game, we investigate whether public firms perform better when they increase the power of their workers’ incentive schemes.

July 13, 2005

Estimating police effectiveness with individual victimisation data

In this paper, we present evidence on the effect of greater numbers of police personnel on victimisation of crime and experience of nuisance.

August 30, 2004

Auctioning incentive contracts; application to welfare-to-work programs

This paper applies the theory of auctioning incentive contracts to welfare-to-work programs.