Publications

July 24, 2020

A Structural Microsimulation Model for Demand-Side Cost-Sharing in Healthcare

Demand-side cost-sharing schemes reduce moral hazard in healthcare at the expense of out-of-pocket risk and equity. With a structural microsimulation model, we show that shifting the starting point of the deductible...

March 15, 2019

Selection and moral hazard effects in healthcare

In the Netherlands, average healthcare expenditures of persons without a voluntary deductible are twice as high as average healthcare expenditures of persons with a voluntary deductible....

December 7, 2017

Cost-Sharing Design Matters: A Comparison of the Rebate and Deductible in Healthcare

Since 2006, the Dutch population has faced two different cost-sharing schemes in health insurance for curative care: a mandatory rebate of 255 euros in 2006 and 2007, and since 2008 a mandatory deductible. Using administrative data for the entire Dutch population, we compare the effect of both cost-sharing schemes on healthcare consumption between 2006 and 2013.

April 25, 2014

Provider competition and over-utilization in health care

This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized.

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